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Sweden has a long and distinguished tradition in economics, beginning with Knut 
Wicksell and continuing with Gustav Cassel, Eli Heckscher, Erik Lindahl, Gunnar 
Myrdal, Bertil Ohlin, and Erik Lundberg, all of whom are now gone. Yet, for several 
of these men, economics was not enough: Wicksell spoke out on moral issues and did 
time in jail, Myrdal was for many years a high official at the United Nations and, 
briefly, a cabinet minister, as was Ohlin who at home made his mark primarily as 
leader of the opposition in a country governed mostly by Social Democrats, serving in 
parliament for 32 years. For Assar Lindbeck, however, economics has been broad 
enough: he has devoted a long and distinguished career over half a century to 
economics, and to economics alone, with unfailing enthusiasm and energy. Not that 
he was not wanted elsewhere: over the years, he has declined challenging job offers 
from an international organization and a Swedish daily newspaper, to name but two 
examples, as well as from universities outside Sweden. Assar has managed to harness 
his varied and wide-ranging talents within the many mansions of economics. He is 
one of the most versatile economists of his generation. Indeed, he is one of those few 
who, for clarity, need to divide their bibliography into categories by subject: 
Macroeconomics and monetary economics, Public economics, Labor economics, 
International economics, Economic systems and economic structures, Methodology 
and history of economic thought, and Swedish economy. His work on these different 
subjects has ranged from pure theory to applied policy-oriented and empirical studies. 
In addition to the numerous scientific publications listed at the end of this interview, 
his bibliography includes nearly 200 articles for magazines and newspapers. His ivory 
tower has always been equipped with a high-speed lift. But, as he points out in the conversation to follow, all his research work as well as his journalism is driven by an 
overarching interest in bettering economic policy and organization – in other words, 
boosting economic and social efficiency for the purpose of lifting ordinary people’s 
standard of life. This has been, and remains, a guiding principle – a Leitmotiv if you 
prefer – from which he has never swerved. Assar Lindbeck is a towering figure in 
Swedish economics, and in Swedish national life.  
 
Gylfason: Let’s not begin at the beginning. According to local legend, Tage 
Erlander, Sweden’s Prime Minister from 1946 to 1969, asked you in the early 1950s 
to become his personal assistant. What happened?  
Lindbeck: In May 1953, I attended a political conference for social-democratic 
university students, where Tage Erlander talked about constitutional issues, and I 
jumped (as always!) into the discussion. In view of my rather critical comments to his 
speech, I was surprised when afterwards he came up to my lunch-table and asked if I 
would like to be his political secretary (assistant). I answered that it would have been 
interesting, but that I was going to start a twelve-month stint of (compulsory) military 
service the next day. But I have a friend that would be suitable for the job, I said, Olof 
Palme, who at the time was the chairman of Swedish Students’ Association. I 
suggested that Palme would be the right man. I remember Erlander’s spontaneous 
reaction: “Good grief, is he a Social Democrat?” Within a few weeks, Palme was 
hired part-time – to work simultaneously with his permanent position at the Staff of 
Defense (Försvarsstaben). This was the beginning of his political career – and the end 
of mine.  
Gylfason: What was it like to study economics at Uppsala in the early 1950s?  
Lindbeck: A graduate student in Sweden at that time was first supposed to devote 
a number of years to a “licentiat-exam.” This included oral examinations on the basis 
of a long reading list, which was composed in cooperation with the professor(s) at the 
Department. Second, the student was supposed to write a licentiate dissertation. A 
normal time for a licentiate degree was, I believe, three to four years. To get a 
doctor’s degree you had subsequently to write a doctoral dissertation, which had to be 
a printed book. This usually took two to four more years, although the time tended to 
infinity in some cases. In some natural sciences, the time was, however, shorter. There 
were no graduate (PhD) courses at Swedish Universities at that time. The only type of 
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once every week.  
I started my graduate studies in Uppsala in 1952. Although the faculty was very 
small, the seminar was usually attended by some excellent scholars: Erik Lindahl, 
Tord Palander, Bent Hansen, and Ragnar Bentzel. In addition to intellectual 
stimulation, I learnt that the speed of an intellect is something very different from its 
depth: Erik Lindahl was extremely slow at seminars, and he seldom won an oral 
discussion. But when he sat down with paper and pencil (as well as scissors and 
glue!), he made contributions far deeper than most fast thinkers. I pursued graduate 
studies in Uppsala only for about a year, using most of my time to learn mathematics 
better by the help of R.G.D.Allen’s book “Mathematical Analysis for Economists.”  
Gylfason: After finishing your master’s degree in economics in Uppsala in 1952, 
your first paid professional job – first part-time, then full time – was in the Ministry of 
Finance in Stockholm. You were at the same time working on your licentiate 
dissertation, which dealt with aspects of fiscal policy, right?  
Lindbeck: I moved over to Stockholm (late in the summer of 1953) when my 
military service was moved from ordinary military duties at the Signal Troops in 
Uppsala to statistical work for the Army Headquarter (Arméstaben) in Stockholm. 
After a few months at the Headquarter, however, I received a phone call from the 
undersecretary of the Treasury (Gunnar Lange), who asked if I would be interested in 
part-time work in the Treasury, simultaneously with my military service. The idea 
was that I would work full-time after the military service, a suggestion that I accepted. 
I guess that the Army Headquarter was too dependent on the Treasury to say “no” to 
this rather unorthodox arrangement. They even accepted that I could sit most of the 
time in the Treasury – also for my work for the Headquarter, which was rather trivial 
descriptive statistical work. (My more traditional military training consisted of the 
duty to train shooting at the Cavalery Regiment one hour every Friday morning.) 
The same type of arrangement continued when I was shifted over from the Army 
Headquarter to the Defense Staff (Försvarsstaben), where I worked together with 
Olof Palme. Here my tasks were more challenging. One project was to analyze the 
total resource costs (including the opportunity costs) of military defense spending in 
Sweden, the United States, and the Soviet Union. Since Palme’s background was in 
law, I had to carry the main burden in this particular project. Another project was to 
follow the political and military development in French Indochina. Here Palme was 
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back (at least) to this period (1953-1954).  
In the Treasury, I worked mainly in the economic analysis group (consisting of 
four persons altogether!). I also worked directly for the secretary of the Treasury (to 
begin with Per Edwin Sköld and subsequently Gunnar Sträng), for instance, providing 
input to speeches and parliamentary discussions. Even though my somewhat less than 
two-year stay in the Treasury delayed my academic studies, I also learned lots of 
things. For instance, I acquired a skeptic attitude to what politicians can achieve, and I 
learned how important short-term tactical issues were for them. A standard question 
of members of government was: how will the national economy develop up until next 
election? This experience was the background for my work in the early 1970s on the 
issue of “endogenous politicians.” In particular, I noted that the time of election 
created a special discontinuity of policies. My understanding of stabilization policy 
behavior was that responsible politicians during approximately a year immediately 
before an election wanted to fight what the general public believed to be the main 
macroeconomic problem during that particular period, regardless of whether this was 
inflation or unemployment, while the consequences emerging immediately after the 
election were of less importance. Of course, this does not mean that politicians always 
would like to “blow up” the economy immediately before the election. The opposite 
would be more likely if high inflation at that time was regarded as the main problem. 
Gylfason: Did you at any time consider devoting your professional life to civil 
service, at home or abroad, rather than to an academic career?  
Lindbeck: Yes, I did consider this option a number of times. But during my stay in 
the Treasury I basically learned more about my own preferences. I became convinced 
that my right place was in academia, rather than in politics or public administration. 
One reason, of course, is that academic work is so intellectually rewarding. But 
another equally important reason is that in academia I can do, and say, exactly what I 
want, which is impossible in large organizations.  
Returning to academic studies in 1954, now at Stockholm University (at that time 
called Stockholms Högskola), I was back struggling with the literature on my reading 
list, which was growing rapidly with Erik Lundberg as my mentor. I started this time 
with Allen’s second book “Mathematical Economics.” But what really turned me on 
was the manuscript of Bent Hansen’s book “The Theory of Fiscal Policy,” which was 
discussed at Erik Lundberg’s Higher seminar, often with me as the appointed 
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that time). I discovered how useful simple mathematical models can be in analyzing 
important economic policy issues. Moreover, when I followed up Bent Hansen’s 
literature references, the most important track led to Paul Samuelson’s “Foundations 
of Economic Analysis”, which became my bread and butter for a number of months 
(although the bread was often hard chewing). There is no exaggeration that these two 
books were the first stepping-stones on my route to becoming a professional 
economist. 
But after less than a year of lonely studies, the Treasury Department intervened in 
my life again (in December 1954). The new Undersecretary (Erik Westerlind) asked 
for my comments on his analysis of the effects of the Government budget, to be 
presented to parliament in January 1955. I answered that the exposition was not the 
right way to analyze the macroeconomic effects of fiscal policy; my objection was 
largely based on what I had just learnt from Bent Hansen’s work. The under-secretary 
answered: “Do it better yourself,” and I was assigned the task of preparing an 
empirical study of the macroeconomic effects of the state budgets in recent years. I 
accepted the kind offer not because I was keen on making a career in the Treasury, but 
because I saw an excellent way of financing my work for the licentiate dissertation. I 
got an office again in the Treasury, where the job took about a year (from the early 
spring of 1955 to the early spring of 1956). The study was printed as an official 
Government report (SOU 1956:48), with a preface by the finance minister.  
Gylfason: What, then, was the point in the study?  
Lindbeck: Rather than using the budget surplus as an indicator of the 
macroeconomic effects of the budget, which was the traditional approach, I made 
separate analyses of the impact on aggregate demand of discretionary fiscal policy 
measures and of automatic budget changes (the automatic stabilizer). The way I 
quantified the impact effect of discretionary policy measures were somewhat similar 
to what in the United State was later called the “full employment surplus.” In both 
cases, the discretionary effect was measured at a given level of capacity utilization, 
although in my study at the existing level rather than, as in calculations of the full 
employment surplus, at full capacity utilization. My study was, however, more 
disaggregated than (later) analyses in terms of the full employment surplus, since I 
looked separately at all budget measures during a specific year, subsequently adding 
them to an aggregate measure. In terms of a simple Keynesian 45-degree diagram, we 
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measures during a year. (Later on, I found out that E. Cary Brown simultaneously and 
independently had made a somewhat similar study of the effects of discretionary 
fiscal policy in the United States in the 1930s; he did not, however, make a separate 
analysis of the effect of the automatic fiscal stabilizer.)  
The dissertation was never translated to English. But the same analytical 
framework was later used by an expert group, appointed by the OECD, studying the 
macroeconomic effects of fiscal policies in all OECD countries. (Walter Heller was 
the chairman of this group, I was one of the members, and Bent Hansen was the 
secretary). I summarized the methods and result of the study in Kyklos 1970.  
Gylfason: What attracted a young man in the far north of Sweden – someone with 
enough artistic talent to have performed his own sonata for clarinet and piano at a 
public concert at the age of eighteen – to economics? I know your father was active in 
the Social Democratic movement at the local level, so I suppose one could perhaps 
say that you were born into the movement, right? Looking back, how would you 
describe these early influences on your decision to become an economist and on your 
work as an economist?  
Lindbeck: We often discussed politics at my home when I was a child, not least at 
the dinner table. Since my father was Chairman of the Governing Municipal Body 
(“Stadsfullmäktiges ordförande”) in my hometown (Luleå in the far north of Sweden) 
I often met local and occasionally also national politicians as a child in my home. This 
probably stimulated my political interest. Perhaps even more important: my father 
was in charge of the welfare administration in northern Sweden, and I sometimes 
followed him on his travels (in the late 1930s and during the 1940s) to poor villages, 
where people could hardly survive without government support. I think this 
experience is an important source of my interest in social issues, and my subsequent 
extensive writings about the welfare state. In retrospect, I am also struck by how 
strong the norms were at that time against living on handouts from the government. 
My father often told me how difficult it often was to convince poor people that they 
needed support from the government. Today, by contrast, different groups of citizens 
compete for benefits, and individuals are quite eager to get as generous benefits as 
possible, although some stigmatization still exists also in Sweden in the case of highly 
discretionary benefits, such as social assistance (“welfare” in US terminology). 
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to study social sciences rather than my other main field of interest, music. I am not 
even sure that I would have been admitted as a student to the Academy of Music in 
Stockholm. Moreover, when I listen to brilliant musicians on radio or television today, 
I realize how limited my own talent really was in that field.  
Gylfason: You have managed to do many different things in your career: your 
main commitment is to research, yes, but your service to your country – and not only 
to your country, but outside Sweden as well – as an economic advisor and as an 
educator, debater, and journalist is also widely admired and appreciated. How do you 
see the role of an economist in modern society?  
Lindbeck: The theory of comparative advantage should apply also within our own 
profession.  We have to accept different roles for different economists – from the most 
abstract mathematical economists to highly applied ones – some in the latter group 
using highly technical methods of analysis, others making more essayistic 
expositions. Some economists, of course, try to make contributions to both theory and 
applications, and they may also shift between highly technical methods and verbal 
discussions, but that is hard work.  
Gylfason: I wonder if absolute advantage doesn’t have something to do with it as 
well.  
Lindbeck: You mean that some leading academic economists occasionally may 
also make outstanding contributions to highly applied policy issues? There are, of 
course, such examples. Wicksell, Cassel, and Heckscher all made important 
contributions not only to academic research but also to the economic policy 
discussion in Sweden before World War II. Something similar may be said about 
leading economists of the “Stockholm School” in the 1930s and during the first post-
World War II decades: Erik Lindahl, Gunnar Myrdal, Bertil Ohlin, and Erik 
Lundberg. You can, of course, find similar examples in other countries. We should 
perhaps be happy that these people occasionally violated the principle of comparative 
advantage by their interventions in the economic policy discussion.  
Gylfason: Before moving to Stockholm to teach and to complete your doctoral 
dissertation, you spent nearly two years in the United States – at the University of 
Michigan, the Federal Reserve Board in Washington, D.C., and at Yale. What were 
your first impressions of America? Have they changed with the passage of time?  
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1957, where I had the privilege of having James Tobin and Richard Musgrave as my 
main mentors at Yale and Michigan, respectively. This was a time when the struggle 
against school segregation had just been accentuated, which was interesting to follow 
in the media. This development has stuck in my mind as a reflection both of the 
serious social and ethnic problems in the United States, and of the hard and committed 
work by many citizens to do something about it.  
It is also difficult to forget the shock among students and faculty at Yale when the 
Sputnik was launched by the Soviet Union in 1957. Everybody came out of their 
offices, and they stood on the ground discussing this unexpected challenge to US 
technological leadership.  
During my stay in the US, I was also struck by the high-quality service in stores, 
restaurants, etc. Indeed, at that time the United State service sector was a model for 
Europe – which I feel is less the case today.  
Gylfason: Even so, Aleksey Kosygin, the Soviet premier (1964-1980), was deeply 
impressed by the same thing, twenty years later.  
Lindbeck: When it comes to the academic community, I was, of course, impressed 
by the high quality of the PhD courses that I attended – often given by teachers with a 
strong European accent, both at Yale and the University of Michigan. However, I was 
surprised by the pronounced partisan positions that many American academics took 
on political issues – much like members of fan clubs of football teams in Europe. I 
wonder why. On my latest visit to the United States, around the presidential election 
in 2004, this partisan engagement was even stronger.  
Gylfason: Endogenous economists, perhaps?  
Lindbeck: In Sweden, which is supposed to be a highly politicized country, I 
seldom know which party my colleagues even vote for.  
Gylfason: And then you went back to Stockholm University where you completed 
your doctoral dissertation. Before I ask you about your thesis, let me ask you this: was 
it in Stockholm that you got to know Gunnar Myrdal, Bertil Ohlin, and Erik 
Lundberg? What role did they play in your development as an economist? – and in 
Sweden’s national life in general.  
Lindbeck: All of them have been important for Swedish society. After I took over 
Gunnar Myrdal’s chair at Stockholm University in 1971, I had quite a lot to do with 
him. His most lasting influence in Sweden is his push, together with Alva Myrdal, for 
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social legislation that, to a considerable extent, has “socialized the family” rather than 
production firms. By that I mean that public-sector institutions have taken over 
traditional family tasks to a considerable extent – such as child care and old-age care – 
and also made the family highly dependent on government-provided benefits of 
different types in the course of the life cycle. The government also intervenes to 
influence the allocation of time between husbands and wives within the family (via 
rules about rights of family members to stay at home to take care of children). It is 
interesting to look at these developments against the background of Alva and Gunnar 
Myrdal’s writing on these issues starting in the mid-1930s. 
As a more personal characterization of Gunnar Myrdal, I would say that he was 
very fast not only in identifying new problems, but also in expressing personal views 
on them, although often without giving up his previous opinions on the same issues. 
Over time, his views therefore looked more and more like “archeological layers” of 
positions that he had taken during different phases of his life – each of them usually 
quite profound. It was, however, not always easy to know which of the layers you 
were confronted with when you talked to him – for instance, Myrdal the central 
planner or Myrdal the anarchist.  
Ohlin’s and Lundberg’s main imprint on Swedish society, I believe, is that they 
helped to dampen the political enthusiasm for central planning and nationalization 
during the first decade after World War II. They were also important advocates of free 
trade. Lundberg, moreover, convinced many Swedish economists about the limits, 
indeed dangers, of attempts to “fine tune” macroeconomic policies. He also helped 
Swedish economists to appreciate the advantages of well functioning markets, 
although the work that clarified this point most effectively for me was Hayek´s little 
article “The Use of Knowledge in Society,” in the American Economic Review in 
1945 – an article also highly appreciated by Lundberg.  
Gylfason: Your doctoral dissertation dealt with monetary analysis. For you and 
others working in this area at the time, Don Patinkin’s work that culminated in his 
Money, Interest and Prices (1956) was your main inspiration, I suppose, in addition to 
Keynes. What economists have had the greatest influence on you over the years?  
Lindbeck: Patinkin’s great book “Money, Interest and Prices” was certainly an 
important inspiration for my dissertation, mainly from a methodological point of view 
(in addition to Bent Hansen’s and Paul Samuelson’s work). This holds, in particular, 
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microeconomic foundations. Indeed, I went even further than him on this point, since 
I derived all behavior functions of individual households, as well as for individual 
firms, simultaneously in all markets – hence, in the case of households, not only labor 
supply and consumption were so derived but also the level of debt and the 
composition of the asset portfolio.  
But my book was to some extent also a “revolt” against Patinkin. I wanted 
monetary and fiscal policy to influence the macroeconomy through many more 
different channels than usually assumed: via income effects, wealth effects, liquidity 
effects, and relative price effects – including intertemporal substitution, which was the 
reason why I systematically used two periods in the model: present and future. I also 
emphasized the role of credit rationing, which I saw as reflecting lenders’ and 
borrowers’ attitudes towards risk. I was inspired to take this broad approach by Robert 
Roosa’s (non-formalized) ideas in the 1950s about what then was called “the new 
theory of credit control in the United States,” which was also the title of a booklet that 
I published a few years before my PhD dissertation. Part of my dissertation would 
today be classified as “behavioral economics” in the sense that results from 
psychology research were integrated with more traditional formal economic analysis. 
In particular, I used Kurt Levin’s theory of “the rising aspiration level” as a response 
to the individual’s earlier success (or failure). 
I have sometimes (perhaps not only jokingly) said that the work on a Swedish PhD 
thesis at that time was so demanding, and timed-consuming, that researchers in 
Sweden never recovered, and that as a result, the dissertation often represented the 
peak of their researcher career. In retrospect, I am sorry to say that my own 
dissertation may be yet another illustration, in the sense that this is the work of mine 
that I am least dissatisfied with.  
Gylfason: Keynes never stood for Parliament: he did not think he had the right 
temperament for politics. Also, he was not a very good speaker. Yet Keynes probably 
had more influence on the political climate in Britain than most politicians in his day. 
The comparison is pertinent here, I think, because you have probably had more 
influence on the way Swedish politicians think about economic policy and 
organization than any other individual, and you have managed this without direct 
political involvement. So, if you want to wield influence as an economist, what, in 
your view, is the way to do it?  
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policies by being an advisor to governments, there is no question that his main 
influence came about indirectly via his influence on our minds – largely via textbooks 
for several generations of students and newspaper articles by many economists and 
others who had been influenced by his ideas.  
My own experience of policy advice and participation in public debate points in 
the same direction. To convince a politician in private about policy reforms is like 
writing in the sand on a beach. The writing will be washed out by the next storm. For 
instance, I convinced members of the (social-democratic) governments in the mid-
1960s and early 1970s of the advantage of removing rent control and to deregulate 
agriculture, but faced by gathering storms in public opinion, the authorities withdrew 
their proposals in both cases. By contrast, I think that I had some sustained influence 
on policy making in some cases when I turned directly to the general public. 
Examples are a great number of newspaper articles about the usefulness of markets, 
and articles where I criticized proposals to collectivize the ownership of shares in the 
late 1970s (via so called “wage-earner-funds”). Another example is the hotly 
discussed proposals by the so-called “Lindbeck-commission” in the early 1990s. In 
retrospect, I look positively at these general experiences: it is probably quite good that 
changes in policies reflect changes in public opinion rather than just private advice. 
After all, this is the idea of democracy.  
Gylfason: Time was when Sweden was the richest of the five Nordic countries. 
Now Sweden is the poorest of the five, as measured by gross domestic product per 
inhabitant at international prices. What happened? Do you feel that Swedish 
economists have done enough to keep Sweden’s economy in good health? Could they 
have done more? If so, how?  
Lindbeck: There is no single reason for the relatively poor economic performance 
in Sweden from the mid-1960s or early 1970s. This is why the Lindbeck commission 
made no less than 113 different proposals to help the Swedish economy recover. If I 
would today, somewhat arbitrarily, single out some specific explanation, I would 
mention the attempts by the authorities during several decades to make life difficult 
for small firms, to discourage private capital accumulation, and to squeeze the 
profitability of firms – all examples of policies that accentuated the negative effects 
on private entrepreneurship of high taxes and a jungle of regulations. Swedish 
politicians tried, in fact, to have “capitalism without capitalists.” I do not think that 
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perspective. Several Swedish economists have certainly tried to make this point in the 
general discussion, but there are always others who challenge the view. A politician 
that listens quite selectively to the discussion among economists can always find some 
expert views that support his or her own priors. 
Gylfason: You were not vocal in the Swedish debate on European Union 
membership before the referendum in 1995, but you came out in favor of Sweden’s 
adoption of the euro before the referendum in 2002. Your side lost by a large margin. 
Now, both issues are clearly political as well as economic, but how do you respond to 
those who claim that Swedish economists have not done enough to guide public 
opinion?  
Lindbeck: I think that Swedish economists did a pretty god job during the 
discussion leading up to the referendum on whether Sweden should join the EMU. 
The pros and cons where well spelled out in newspaper articles as well as in various 
reports, including the report by the so-called Calmfors commission. The EMU issue 
is, however, quite technical and also very complex. It is, therefore, natural that the 
voters formed their opinions very much on the basis of their own general attitudes 
towards the EU. For historical reasons (Sweden being outside the two World Wars), 
Swedes are less favorable to the entire EU project than citizens of other European 
countries, possibly except the UK. According to many empirical studies, Swedes do 
not feel much of a European identity. The referendum on EMU membership gave the 
electorate an opportunity to express their generally cool feelings towards the EU 
project as a whole.  
Gylfason: The German economy seems to be in trouble: unemployment is still 
measured in double digits and growth remains sluggish. Professor Hans-Werner Sinn 
in Munich has recently published a book in German asking, even in the title of the 
book, whether Germany can still be saved. What lessons can Germany learn from 
Sweden?  
Lindbeck: Germany’s problems look somewhat similar to Sweden’s problems ten 
years ago. One lesson from Sweden is that delaying reforms may result in an 
accumulation of serious problems. Another lesson is that an acute crisis may be used 
by politicians to make unpopular, but in a long-term view important reforms. Such 
crisis awareness certainly helped Sweden to push through a package of reforms in the 
first half of the 1990s. Maybe the crisis awareness in Germany has finally reached a 
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German government is finally willing to use this opportunity.  
The Swedish pension reform is worth looking at as an example of how welfare-
state arrangements might be redesigned. The Swedish pension reform means that 
there are no longer any promises about the level of future benefits, not even as a ratio 
of earlier income. The level of the pension benefit is contingent on the growth of real 
wages and changes in life expectancy after retirement. This will make the pension 
system financially stable. The same general idea may be applied to other welfare-state 
benefits, by making the generosity of benefits contingent, for instance, on the future 
growth rate of the tax base and on the number of beneficiaries in each benefit system. 
Sweden also made a number of constitutional reforms in the 1990s, and I believe that 
the Germans should also take a new look at the appropriateness of their constitution, 
which was created during historically special circumstances. 
Gylfason: How about labor market reform? Sweden has experienced a substantial 
decrease in unemployment in recent years without really implementing the labor 
market liberalization advocated by many economists, including you. How did this 
come about?  
Lindbeck:  During the depression in Sweden in the first half of the 1990s, open 
unemployment increased from about 3.5 to about 8.5 percent. Thanks to a cyclical 
upswing, starting in 1995, the current figure has been brought down to 5.5 percent. I 
had expected a stronger reduction during a stark cyclical upswing, in particular since 
Sweden has made a large number of structural reforms (although mainly outside the 
labor market) in the recent decade. We should also notice that about sixteen percent of 
people in working age today are financed by benefits other than unemployment 
benefits, such as labor market programs, sickness benefits, and early retirement. This 
means that figures on open unemployment give only a very partial picture of the 
situation in the labor market. I do not think that Swedish economists in general would 
say that the labor market functions well in the country – or in most other European 
countries for that matter. 
Gylfason: Charles Kindleberger used to say: Economists, especially those from 
small countries, should not spend their lives away from home. Do you agree? 
Lindbeck: I assume that Kindleberger meant that a scholar in social sciences can 
make more important contributions to the public discussion in the country where he, 
or she, grew up than in a country to which he or she has moved in mature age. Maybe 
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that Sweden may be regarded as a kind of real-world economic-policy laboratory, 
although occasionally perhaps a “high-risk” one. There are some advantages to being 
close to such a laboratory. In particular, my choice of research topics has been 
strongly influenced by this proximity. This may be a reason why my choice of 
research topics, in particular in mature age, has been more influenced by real-world 
phenomena than by the academic research literature. There are, of course, also 
personal reasons for staying in Sweden, such as the privilege of working at the 
Institute for International Economic Studies (IIES), which by itself provides an 
international environment.  
Gylfason: Indeed, you have probably been more intensively engaged in the 
economic-policy discussion in Sweden than any other economist over a period of 
some forty years – from stabilization and growth policies to housing and agriculture 
policy, welfare-state arrangements, and the issue of public versus private ownership of 
the means of production. And so on.  
Lindbeck: That is probably true, and I could clearly not have played a similar role 
in a country to which I would have moved in mature age, in particular not in a large 
country.  
Gylfason: Some natural scientists and others have expressed their doubts about the 
value of awarding Nobel prizes for economics. They claim that economics is too soft, 
too subjective, and too imprecise to merit such a prestigious prize. In a recent article 
in Dagens Nyheter, Sweden’s leading daily newspaper, a professor in mathematical 
statistics and two others went as far as claiming that the economics prize reduces the 
value of all Nobel prizes. As a member of the Committee for Prize in Economic 
Science in Memory of Alfred Nobel for twenty-five years (1969-94) and its chairman 
for fourteen years (1980-94), how do you respond to these voices?  
Lindbeck: It is true that Swedish newspapers, on some occasions, have published 
critical comments about the Economics Prize. Occasionally, members of the Royal 
Academy of Sciences have replied by arguing that there is a case for rewarding not 
only natural scientists but also social scientists. After all, one of the most striking 
developments in research after the time of Nobel’s testament is the enormous 
expansion of social science research, not least in economics. There have, indeed, been 
suggestions to the effect that it would be better to have a prize in social sciences in 
general rather than just an economics prize. It is, however, easier to agree about a 
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heterogeneous area to reward. Moreover, the donor of the prize, Bank of Sweden, 
happened to be interested just in a prize in economics.  
The specific criticism that you mentioned was based mainly on the assertion that 
mathematics is not very useful in economic analysis. This criticism is quite difficult to 
understand for active researchers in our field. There are, of course, examples of 
studies where mathematical formulations are unnecessary, such as when the 
conclusions follow directly from the assumptions, or when complex mathematics 
hides the lack of profound thinking. But a research field should not be judged by bad 
examples. We have all experienced, time after time, that many economic problems are 
too complex to be understood without the help of mathematical models. In particular, 
good mathematical models give predictions that we may not expect beforehand – 
although we are often able to make a verbal, intuitive explanation afterwards. It is also 
clear that economists, in cooperation with statisticians, have developed methods for 
empirical, quantitative analysis that are rather sophisticated also in comparison with 
statistical methods used in natural sciences. Unfortunately, people outside our 
profession get most, or all, of their information about economics from the general 
policy discussion or from the business pages in newspapers. 
Gylfason: How do you choose your research topics? What is your method?  
Lindbeck: On the surface, it looks perhaps as if I have jumped from one field of 
economics to another during my career. But what I have done, without perhaps 
realizing it from the beginning, is that I have rather systematically focused my 
research on different aspects of economic policy. After my licentiate dissertation on 
fiscal policy, and my PhD dissertation on monetary theory and policy, I worked for a 
number of years on price regulations in housing and agriculture. Next, I turned to 
income distribution policies and employment policies. My latest field, where I still 
work, concerns different aspects of the welfare state, including social insurance and 
the provision of human services. I have also worked, from time to time, on the pure 
theory of economic policy, including attempts to endogenize government behavior as 
well as labor union behavior, and in this context to study different types of economic 
and political equilibria. My work on alternative economic systems may, of course, 
also be regarded as studies of economic policy; this system-oriented approach 
provided the structure to my booklet “The Political Economy of the New Left” in 
1971. The booklet was largely inspired by my experiences on the Campuses of 
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manuscript to a commercial publisher, after I had given a talk on the issue at MIT. 
During the 1970s, in particular, I also worked on the consequences for economic 
policies in various fields of the internationalization of the economic system. Because 
of my specific experiences from Sweden, I have devoted quite a lot of time, maybe 
too much time, to the Swedish economy – reflected, for instance, in two books and 
also joint reports written with others.  
Thus, while I have learnt analytical techniques from other economists, my 
inspiration about research topics mainly comes from real-world problems related to 
economic policy in various countries. This means that I have got my ideas about 
research topics mainly from news media and personal, every-day experiences. 
Obvious examples are the apparent importance of credit rationing, the permanent 
housing shortage in Sweden, the surplus production in European agriculture, traffic 
jams in cities, high persistence of unemployment in several European countries, 
strongly delayed incentive effects of higher tax rates and more generous welfare-state 
benefits, etc. 
Gylfason: Traffic jams? Tell me more.  
Lindbeck: After my writings about rent control and the housing shortage, it was 
natural to look at traffic jams as “street shortage” arising from the prevailing price 
system for street space. So, when the Government in early 1960 asked a number of 
economists to write essays (in Swedish) on resource allocation policies, I chose the 
topic “The price system in long-term planning.” I argued that traffic jams were not a 
market failure but rather a “policy failure” because the streets are owned by local 
governments that set a zero price of using them, in spite of profound scarcity. This not 
only generates traffic jams; it also stimulates demands in the political process for 
knocking down buildings for the purpose of broadening the streets. 
Gylfason: Did your work with Jörgen W. Weibull on formal models of 
probabilistic voting emanate from your previous writings on “endogenous 
politicians”?  
Lindbeck: Yes, it did. After joint work with Jörgen on other issues, we found out 
that we had a common interest in how competition among political parties may 
influence redistribution policies. As in our previous joint work, we could exploit each 
other’s comparative advantages as well as obvious complementarities. Indeed, I could 
not have written these papers all by myself – and Jörgen would perhaps not have done 
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descriptions of the outcome of political competition than median voter models. 
Gylfason: After the collapse of communism, many leading economists, in America 
as well as in Europe, could not resist the urge to tackle the many challenging 
problems that arose from the transition from plan to market. You did not, however. 
Why not?  
Lindbeck: I decided not to write about transition economies because the problems 
seemed too complex to me. I also thought that studies in this field would require too 
much institutional knowledge about the countries concerned. Moreover, I thought that 
experience in these countries would mainly reflect temporary phenomena, and that it 
would be difficult to draw general lessons from such studies.  
I have today some difficulties with these rationalizations for not studying transition 
economies, since I have just started a paper on “Socio-Economic Interaction in 
China.” The background for the paper is that I gave a number of lectures at various 
places in China in the spring of 2004 on “An Outsider’s View of the Chinese 
Economy.” Then, I made perhaps the usual non-economist’s mistake: “now that I 
have put in several months of work on this issue (sunk costs!), I should put in 
whatever extra work is needed to produce a publishable paper!” So here I am working 
on a transition paper after all, although I try to limit the topic to issues where I can 
draw on my earlier work, in particular, my work on social and welfare-state issues, 
though in this case in the context of a different environment than in previous works. 
Gylfason: You have, indeed, devoted extensive effort over the years to studying 
incentive problems in welfare states, problems that seem today to be as acute as ever, 
on both sides of the Atlantic and also farther afield. What is your take on economic 
research in this important field?  
Lindbeck: This is my favorite research field today. But it is also a very difficult 
field. Many of us have strong priors on welfare issues, and it is often painful to find 
out that your priors do not always hold.  
It is rather generally agreed among economists that increased welfare-state 
spending from a low initial level is likely not only to improve social conditions in a 
country but also to boost economic efficiency and growth. This assumes, of course, 
that the political system is willing, and able, to expand types of spending that actually 
improve income security and provide better quantity or quality (or both) of human 
capital, for instance via better sanitation, health care, and education. It is also 
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it will sooner or later – long before it reaches 100 percent of GDP – reach a stage 
where the marginal benefits fall short of the marginal costs. This is, of course, the 
simple hypothesis of a hump-shaped relation between social spending and the level 
(or rate of growth) of GDP, with the former assumed to influence the latter.  
Gylfason: Clearly, Haiti would benefit from increased social spending. Would 
Sweden?  
Lindbeck: The problem of establishing, empirically, the peak of the hump is a 
formidable research task. First, you have problems of reverse causation and non-
linearities. Second, there are serious problems of aggregation. We have lots of partial 
evidence both about the return on investment in human capital and about efficiency 
losses due to tax wedges and moral hazard in the context of various benefit systems. 
But even when we have such information of partial effects, we confront the difficulty 
of adding up all partial effects.  
It is, therefore, natural that many economists have taken shortcuts by simply 
regressing GDP growth on broad aggregates of tax revenues (as a share of GDP) and 
large aggregates of public-sector spending, such as transfer payments and public 
consumption. Overall, my reading of the literature in this field is that GDP growth 
does tend to be negatively associated with the size of taxes and government spending 
(as shares of GDP) when we confine the study to developed countries. But the 
simultaneity problem is certainly not solved in these studies. Moreover, we should 
never expect very robust relations between broad aggregates of this type, since the 
consequences for the level or growth rate of GDP must depend on the composition of 
public-sector spending, the detailed rules in various benefit systems, and the structure 
of taxes – among other things. Because of the difficulties in empirical research in this 
field, many writers have found it necessary to rely instead on scattered partial and 
even anecdotal evidence, although researchers necessarily feel somewhat 
uncomfortable about relying only on evidence of this type.  
Gylfason: What do you think the Americans can learn from the Europeans about 
efficient and fair welfare policies? 
Lindbeck: The European evidence indicates that it is possible, in principle, to 
bring about quite significant income security with the help of mandatory social 
insurance system, without a major collapse of national economies. The experience 
also shows that it is possible to provide fairly good education and health care also for 
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come much farther than United States in launching voucher systems for human 
services (child care, education, and old-age care), in spite of the fact that the idea 
seems to have emerged in the United States, where it has been pushed by Rose and 
Milton Friedman. After all, vouchers are a brilliant way to combine collective 
financing with freedom of choice and competition among service providers. 
It is, however, clear that most European countries today have serious problems 
with their welfare-state arrangements. Many of these systems are not financially 
stable. They have also resulted in undesired behavior adjustments, in particular, in the 
labor market. And some welfare-state arrangements have not been much adjusted to 
recent socioeconomic changes, such as slower productivity growth, unfavorable 
changes in demography, more unstable families, and globalization.  
More generally, the European experience suggests that welfare-state spending 
easily “overshoots” reasonable limits, when many interest groups discover that they 
may have more to gain from generous government benefits than from additional work. 
By “overshooting” I mean that many observers, perhaps even a majority of the 
population, believe that the marginal costs considerably exceed the marginal benefits, 
but that the political process, including distributional conflicts in the political arena, 
make retreat difficult.  
I have sometimes also asserted that there is a tendency for the welfare state to 
develop into a “transfer state.” What I mean is that taxes may finally be so high that 
the government has to restrict spending on core government activities, such as 
collective goods (the legal system and research) to be able to finance galloping 
transfer payments. The government may also find it increasingly difficult to finance 
human services, such as education and health care, in particular, because the relative 
costs of such services tend to rise rapidly over time since productivity rises faster in 
the private sector than in the public-sector production of human services (Baumol’s 
Law). We may sooner or later wind up in a situation when the government cannot 
satisfy citizens’ demand for such services as long as they are tax-financed, even if 
households want to pay for more services of this type. In my judgment, several 
European countries approach this situation today. It is suggestive that aggregate 
spending on both education and health care today is higher in the United States than in 
Europe in spite of the fact – or perhaps just because of the fact – that such spending is 
to a much greater extent tax-financed in Europe than in the United States. 
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income security and human services, such as users’ fees and insurance premia. 
Individuals’ willingness to pay for such services may then very well result in 
increased provision of such services. 
Gylfason: What, then, could Europe learn from the United States in this field? 
Lindbeck: The most negative lessons from welfare-state arrangements in the 
United States, in my view, is that there are high social costs of not taking effective 
actions to educate the lowest decile groups in the skill distribution. Moreover, in the 
health area, it is quite clear that ignorance about nutrition creates severe health 
hazards for the population. Preventive health care is poorly developed in the country, 
in particular among people in low-income groups. It is also obvious that the absence 
of mandatory health care insurance creates a very uneven protection across population 
groups against high costs in connection with health hazards.  
There are, however, also positive lessons from welfare-state reforms in the United 
States. The experimentation with “work-in-benefits” for low-wage employees is 
important. In principle, it must be better to subsidize the work of individuals with low 
productivity than (as in several countries in Europe) to push up their wages to levels 
that make them unemployed, so that they have to be financed by various types of 
transfers. I think that Europe, sooner or later, will agree that the United States is on 
the right track in this specific field, in particular, if the system is extended to more 
groups in society. President Clinton’s welfare reform was also important, because it 
showed that it is possible to increase employment among disadvantaged groups of 
citizens by making welfare benefits contingent on labor market training or work. I 
also believe that more flexibility in relative wages in Europe would boost labor 
mobility and stimulate investment in human capital. This is, however, not likely to 
occur to any large extent because of strong labor union power in most European 
countries. 
Gylfason: Let us continue with the comparison between America and Europe. 
Labor market institutions differ in America and Europe – and, yes, also within Europe 
– and these differences have influenced the direction of labor market research on the 
two continents. How do you size up the situation? Is your distinction, in your work 
with Dennis Snower, between insiders and outsiders in labor markets less helpful in 
the United States than in Europe?  
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States, since there are always costs of firing and hiring labor, although these costs 
certainly are lower in the United States than in most countries in Europe. And as long 
as there are such costs, which may take the form of insiders’ harassment of 
underbidding outsiders, insiders are able to push up their wages above the reservation 
wage of outsiders without being fired. Perhaps we could argue that outsider status in 
the United States, much more than in Europe, is connected with poor education for, 
say, the two lowest deciles of individuals in the distribution of human capital. In 
Europe, outsider status has more to do with privileges for those who happen to have a 
job in the first place, in particular, if they have seniority status as a result of legislation 
that prescribes “last-in-first-out.” 
The main consequences of the insider-outsider divide in Europe is, I believe, that 
insiders can use business upswings to push up real wages without much concern for 
the negative effects on the employment prospects of unemployed workers and new 
entrants in the labor market. As a result, workers tend to be stuck in the 
unemployment pool (high unemployment persistence) for long periods of time after 
the emergence, and even after the reversal, of large unemployment-creating 
macroeconomic shocks.  
Gylfason: Earlier in our conversation, you mentioned the strong, and increasing, 
political partisanship in academic circles in the United States, at a time when Sweden 
and Europe appear less politicized than before. Is it possible that this development has 
to do with differences in social organization in Europe and America – differences that 
have produced significantly greater inequalities in the distribution of incomes and 
wealth in the United States than in continental Europe? What do you think?  
Lindbeck: It is certainly possible that this development has contributed to 
sharpening political conflicts in the country. But why would it have generated so 
much political controversy and partisanship just in academic circles? After all, 
academics have gained from this development. Are academics particularly altruistic 
on income distribution issues? I do not really know. Moreover, why hasn’t the 
dramatic increase in unemployment in Europe, and the marginalization of many 
groups of citizens in that part of the world, resulted in increased political conflict, and 
increased partisanship among academics, in Europe? I am still confused on this issue. 
Or could it be the case that increased political polarization in the United States, also in 
the academic community, is a result of the country’s more controversial foreign policy 
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a world where the Soviet block was always a serious threat than to defend the United 
States’ role today as “world police.” 
Gylfason: In the past few years, you have studied aspects of social norms – norms 
that can either help or hinder economic development, as your account of your travels 
with your father earlier in our conversation made clear. What is the story?  
Lindbeck: While generous welfare-state arrangements were built up in Europe 
from the late 1940 to the late 1970s, pronounced evidence of disincentive effects on 
work and benefit dependency did not emerge until the 1980s and 1990s. I have 
hypothesized that endogenous social norms may help explain this apparent paradox. 
More specifically, strong norms in favor of work, and against living off government 
benefits, emerged before the welfare state was built up, simply because it was difficult 
to survive without working during that period. Parents, schools, the Church, and other 
institutions also contributed to instilling and enforcing such norms. Then came the 
welfare state, which reduced the return on work as compared to non-work, and hence 
made it easier for the individual to survive without working. To begin with, the norms 
inherited from the past constrained and delayed the negative effects on work of the 
new incentive structure. Over time, however, some individuals started to use the 
generous benefit systems more and more, and institutions that had earlier preached the 
virtues of work stopped doing so. And when more individuals live on different types 
of benefits, the stigmatization of doing so is likely to recede. The delayed incentive 
effects then emerged. 
I started my work in this field by rather informal (essayistic) papers, but have later 
formalized the ideas in a number of papers with Sten Nyberg and Jörgen W. Weibull. 
In these models, where individual market behavior is influenced by both economic 
incentives and norms, market behavior interacts with political behavior (voting). As 
we might expect, models with social norms easily give rise to multiple equilibria, one 
with low and one with high welfare-state spending. 
Gylfason: Is there empirical evidence for this?  
Lindbeck: Empirical research in this field is in its infancy. There are, however, 
some suggestive indications consistent with the hypothesis of endogenous social 
norms. One is the remarkable rise in the incidence of sickness absence in some 
countries (such as the Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden), which cannot be explained 
by deterioration in people’s health. Another example is the huge increase in early 
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Netherlands). It is also striking that the number of sick days varies drastically across 
neighborhoods in Sweden (differences as large as 30-40 days per year) even after 
controlling for about thirty explanatory variables concerning individual 
characteristics, type of municipality, type of profession, type of firm where people 
work, etc. It is also likely that unemployment persistence is accentuated by receding 
social norms in favor of work or against living on benefits from the government. What 
all this means is that endogenous changes in social norms may accentuate problems of 
moral hazard in connection with various welfare-state arrangements. 
Gylfason: We mentioned before that you succeeded Gunnar Myrdal at the 
University of Stockholm in 1971, also as Director of the Institute for International 
Economic Studies, and you went on to run the Institute for a quarter of a century, until 
1995. Under your direction, the Institute became an acknowledged world-class center 
of research. How did you do it?  
Lindbeck: I concentrated on three tasks. First, I worked hard to attract funds to the 
institute by way of direct contact with the Treasury and the Department of Education, 
as well as by carefully drafted applications for research grants. Second, I was 
extremely selective in hiring and keeping researchers and graduate students. Third, I 
tried to stick to a small number of principles of running research institutes. A number 
of years ago, I summarized my experiences in the form of “Ten Commandments” for 
directors of research institutes. In tightly condensed form, they may be formulated as 
follows. (You find the full text on the homepage of the IIES.) 
1.  A research institute should try to reach the international research frontier and, 
indeed, contribute to push that frontier ahead.  
2.  For such ambitions to be fulfilled, it is important to publish internationally, 
and to abstain from having one’s own printed publications.  
3.  It is also important to have outstanding foreign visitors at an institute – to 
import knowledge and to give a further boost to the international aspiration level.   
4.  Every researcher should develop his/her own international research network.  
5.  The activities should also be concentrated to a limited number of areas.   
6.  Successful research also requires that a critical mass of research effort is 
reached in one or a few areas.   
7.  A strong interaction between theoretical and methodological work, on the one 
hand, and applied research, on the other, is important for successful research.   
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at research institutes. The rest can be delegated, except fund raising.  
9.  It is a great advantage for a research institute to be part of a good university. 
10.  It is also useful if at least some members produce articles and books not only 
for the international research community, but also for laymen interested in   
economic issues. This is good both for the researchers themselves (who thereby 
develop their common sense) and for the possibilities for the institute to get 
research funds.  
I want to believe that the Institute has been helped by adhering to principles like 
these.  
Gylfason: Assar, you paint. You have exhibited your paintings in Stockholm on 
three occasions since 1997. William Baumol also paints and sculpts and Jan 
Tinbergen was a painter, to name but two, so you are not alone. Is there a connection 
between your painting and your work as an economist? Or do you inhabit two 
separate worlds that do not speak to one another?  
Lindbeck: The main connection is a kind of complementarity. Research is a highly 
specialized activity. Many researchers, as well as other specialists, have a need to 
broaden their lives by also doing something quite different. In my case, this happens 
to be painting and music. Otherwise, I do not see much of a relation, or even 
similarity, between economic research and painting. Visual art operates via 
suggestion, while research operates via analysis. Some paintings, though not mine, 
may influence people’s attitudes to various societal phenomena, for instance, by 
showing the horrors of war (such as in Goya) or misery due to poverty (such as in 
Kollwitz). But I have never seen any painting that has helped me understand how 
economic, political, or social systems function. To provide such understanding is the 
task of scientific research, although artistic activities other than visual art occasionally 
may help us understand how a society functions. Literature is, perhaps, the most 
obvious example – from the time of the ancient dramas to Dickens and Solzhenitsyn.  
Gylfason: Yes, and Balzac. Thank you.  
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